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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STERLING SERVICES,
Plaintiff, Respondent
SCT #16918

vs.
ROBERT B. MAUGHAN and
CANDY MAUGHAN,

Civil No. 17590

Defendant, Appellant
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The District Court dismissed Defendant's Counterclaim
which alleged that Plaintiff violated Utah's Uniform Consumer
Credit Code.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks a confirmation of the District Court's
Order of Dismissal of Defendant's Counterclaim.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Plaintiff owns and operates a service station and
grocery store in Garden City, Utah. The Defendants became
indebted to the Plaintiff through purchases made on an open
account between 1973 and 1977 because they failed to pay for
all the goods and services received. The parties had orally
agreed that no interest would be charged if the account was
kept current, however, since the account had been left
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delinquent for so long, the Plaintiff believed he was entitled
to the amount of interest printed on some of the sales
receipts, 12%. The trial court awarded the Plaintiff principal
in the amount of $2,833.19 with 6% per annum interest for 13
months of $184.16, or $3,017.35. Prior to s~it, Defendant had
paid $3,000, which was applied to the account. The Court
dismissed Plaintiff's claim for unpaid rents for use of
premises owned by Plaintiff because the limitations period
had; expired.
The parties also entered into a conditioqal sales
security agreement for a snowmobile executed December 30,
1974 in which the Plaintiff was the Seller and the Defendant
was the Buyer. The parties contemplated selling the contract
to a bank, but the bank would not accept assignment of the
con~ract and the parties thereafter agreed to certain conflicting
terms regarding the agreement. The trial court awarded the
Plaintiff $1,300.00 principal still owed on the snowmobile.
The Plaintiff asked for the highest interest rate allowable,
18% to be levied on the contract. Since confusion had
resulted over the snowmobile contract, the Court found that
the contract had been abandoned and had no force or effect.
Accordingly, the Court awarded as a judgment in favor of the
Plaintiff 6% interest per annum from Janury 25, 1975 to
January 25, 1980 or $390.00. This brought the total amount
awarded to the Plaintiff for the snowmobile contract to
$1,690.00 including principal and simple interest.
Court dismis~:!!J i-Lr: rk~fendant: r .~~ counterclaim, which
was b c1., ·-~ d on P 1 a inti ff ' s a 11 \.:!•Jed viol a ti on of Utah ' s Uniform
Consumer Credit Code. This involves a renalty for creditors
who contract for and receive a charge in excess of the
allowable amount. The Court found as matters of fact that
there was no contract and no money was received as a charge
'Tlte
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in excess of the amount allowed by the u.c.c.c. The court
explained that just because· the Plaintiff stated that a
contract existed did not mean that the Plaintiff had contracted
for or received payment in excess of the act. Defendant had
denied its liability under a contract. Because there was no
violation of the u.c.c.c., ~he Trial Court dismissed Defendant's
counterclaim.
POINT I
; J

The Trial Court properly dismissed Defendant's Counterclaim
concerning Plaintiff's alleged violation of Utah's Uniform
Consumer Credit Code because no contract existed between the
parties and no monies were received as a charge in excess of
the allowable amount.
If a creditor has contracted for or received a charge
in excess of the amount allowed by the u.c.c.c., the debtor
may recover a penalty from the creditor (U.C.A. 708-3-201(4),
708-5-202). The Trial Court found, as a matter of fact,
that no contract existed between the parties. The Court
also found, as a matter of fact, that the Plaintiff had not
received money as a charge in excess of the amount allowed
by the act. Since the u.c.c.c. only governs situations
where a contract existed or monies were received as a charge
in excess of the allowable amount, it has no application
her~.

POINT II

The Trial Court properly dismissed the Defendant's
Counterclaim as it related to the Plaintiff's alleged violation
of the u.c.c.c. for failure to ~isclose the interest rate
charged.

3

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The Trial Court made no finding that Plaintiff failed
to disclose. The Court did not find that the Plaintiff
should have dis~losed any information beyond that which was
disclosed. The Court's finding of a failure to disclose is.
necessary for recovery under this act.
Utah Code Annotated 70(B)-5-203 provides for civil
li~bility for violation of the u.c.c.c. disclosure provisions.
Th!s liability or penalty may be equal to the sum of the
~<::tual damaCJ·e sustained by the person,
Here the Defendant
sustained no actual damages. The Court awarded the Plaintiff
the principal sum of money still due him plus interest of 6%
per annum. Since Defendant was not hurt in this situation,
this provision of the u. C. A. is not applicable. u. C. A.
70(B)-5-203(b)(i) allows for liability of twice the amount
of any finance charge used in connection with this situation.
The amended Complaint shows that the Defendant's $3,000.00
payment in advance of suit was applied to the principal of
the open account. The Court found, as a matter of fact,
that no finance charge was collected by the Plaintiff.
Since no finance charge was paid, this provision of the
u.c.c.c. is inapplicable to this situation. Even if the
Court found a finance charge existed, the liability in this
section of the u.c.c.c. is not greater than $1,000.00. The
Defendant's brief wrongly implies that this sum of money may
be greater in this situation.
)

I

Defendant's counsel makes an ~nfair argument in asserting
that tl1e $3,000 . 00 paid was applied to n:1 undisclosed interest
charge. In his interrogatories, Defendant asked where the
money was applied and the answer was that it was applied on
the open account. The matter was thereafter brought to the
Court and testimony was to the effect that $3,000.00 was
payabl iov'ards the account according to whatever scheme the
1•·
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Court found just. Although the Plaintiff asked that it be
applied toward the 12% inte~est on the open account, the
Court found against the Plaintiff on that issue. This does
not mean that the interest was applied on an undisclosed
interest charge, or that it was improperly implied.
The case of Bill Brown Motor, Inc. v. Crane 589 P2d
708 (Okla. 1978) involves a seller's failure to disclose
credit information to a co-signer. The case stands on the
principal that if a seller regularly engages in similar
credit transactions, failure to disclose credit information
will result in a fine or penalty. Plaintiff did not regularly
sell snowmobiles. It was not part of his'normal business.
Defendant attempts to apply· Brown to a situation that is not
similar. Plaintiff merely asked the Court if he might
charge 18% on the snowmobile contract. Plaintiff asked for
12% interest on the open account because some of the sales
receipts had 12% printed on them. Plaintiff in good faith,
felt he was entitled to interest on Defendant's delinquent
account. The Court awarded Plaintiff 6% interest on the
entire amount.
The case of Knox v. Thomas 512 P2d 664 (Utah 1973), a
disclosure case, is not applicable because it alleged the
Defendant failed to calculate the percentage rate and enter
it. The reason this case is distinguishable is because
there the issue was whether there was a calculation and
whether it was entered. The Defendant in his Counterclaim
failed to allege or prove any specific items that should
have been calculated and entered that were not.

The Oklahoma case on which the Defendant relies and
upon which he attempts to write Utah law, Kuykendall v. Malernee,
516 P2d 558 (Okla. 1973) can be distinguished. The case
dealt with a situation which started out as a loan of money
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and not a consumer or other purchase. The amount of the
loan was $600.00 and was repayable in 6 months of $720.00.
In fact, the parties post dated a check for $720.00 with
which to make the repayment. The interest charge of $120.00
for 6 months was calculated to be about;40% interest. It is
not surprising that the Court found the interest rate was
cl~arly in excess of 18%.
The Court also found the lender
was a pawn broker and went on to ac.tually,;.~ind that there
was a supervised loan. In Kuykendall, the Court m~de findings
of .a supervised loan, made a specific finding of a rate of
interest, made a finding that there was a consumer loan, and
made a finding that the lender was definitely subject to
pawn broker requirements of the state of Oklahoma. Moreover,
the Oklahoma statute required that loans in.the excess of
10% (as compared to Utah's 18%) constituted a supervised
loan. The Court also found that the matter was brought
within the statute of limitations. Clearly 1 the case is not
precedent for the case being considered by this Court. None
of ·the findings of the Oklahoma Court case were found or
urged upon the Court. In fact, the allegations were not
adequately presented nor was proof offered which would
prevent a finding along the same line as was made in Kuykendall.
In our situation, the Trial Court found there was nJ
failure to disclose on the Plaintiff's part. The Plaintiff
in good faith felt that he could charge interest because
the Defendant had failed to keep the revolving account
current and because some of the sales slips had 12% printed
on them and bore Defendant's siqnature or initials. The
Plaintiff in good faith felt it was proper to charge interest
becausf:> of Defendant's failure to keep the account current.
Defendant's Counterclaim doesn't. meet the criteria
specified in Utah rode Annotated 70(b)-5-203 which provides
for civil liRbility foe violation of the u.c.c.c. disclosure
provision:
'I'he
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A.
Ne;> actual damage wa~i incurred by the Defendant
by any of Plaintiff's actions.
B.
The Court found that no finance charge
levied by the Plaintiff.

w~s

C.
Defendant attempts to construe this statute
so that it implies that liability on Plaintiff's part, if
there were any violation, would be greater than $1,000.
D.
Defendant did not make his claim within
the one or two year period required by the u.c.c.c.
E.

The Court specifically found no contract
,J \

existed.

Because the fact situation in this case is not applicable
to any of the present statutes and because the Court found
no failure to disclose on Plaintiff's part occured in this
situation, the Trial Court properly dismissed Defendant's
Counterclaim.
POINT III
The Trial Court correctly dismissed Defendant's Counterclaim
as it related to Plaintiff's alleged attempt to receive
excessive interest rates in violation of the u.c.c.c. provisions.
The Trial Court made no finding concerning excessive
interest rates being charged by Plaintiff.
The present usury statute for consumer loans in Utah is
codifiPd in 70B-3-201, U.C.A. This statute provides the
maximum legal rate of interest in consumer loans to be 18%
per year if the loan finance charge contracted for and received

7
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does not exceed 1 and 1/2 percent per month. The Defendant
failed to allege that the snowmobile contract was for consumer
goods, and 708-5-202 provides that in nonconsumer related
transactions, the'; parties may contract for any interest rate.
The, Court did not make a specific finding as to whether the'
snowmobile purchase was a consumer purchase or not. Thus,
there is not justification for arguin~ penalties,~ayable
und~r 70B-5-202,f as the Defendant did relative to the second
'
paragraph
of his Counterclaim. In fact, although the Defendant
fails to specify wherein the Plaintiff allegedly violated
1os~s-202;·:~}'the only possible subpart· violated would be
subpart (21~ and· that section, as well as all other sections,
provides a one year statute of limitations {or under c~rtain
circumstances a 2 year statute of limitations) after which
no action can be brought.. According to the snowmobile·
con,tract admitted and upon which Defendants rely for their
couriterclaim, the last payment ~ould·have been made 25·
months afte~ Ja~~ary 25, 1975. The Counter~laim is dated
March 5, 1979, well beyond the period of limitations.The Defendant rests his entire argument for the Counterclaim
on .the appearance of the 18 .16% interest shown on the face
of the alleged contract. That contract is the same the
Court found the parties had both abandoned. Nowhere except
in the argument does he allege that the Plaintiff actually
attempted to enforce the rate of interest. Clearly the
Plaintiff attempted to receive 18% interest on the complaint
and in the amended complaint but never more than that amount.
As the evidence showea, the actual caL.'.,,Ln:i.on was based on
16.97%. The Plaintiff did not ask for any other interest
rate than the highest leg,d rate and at ·:d l times acknowledged
and as'::c·rted a rate at 18% per annum or less. No evidence
showed that the actual rate charged would be 18.16% was
eithe~ offered or presented or found by the Court.
Even if
the Court would have found that the Plaintiff receivLd
excessive interest rates, the u.c.c.c. would not have applied.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The U.C.C.C. provision 70(8)-2-104 provides for maximum
interest charges for consumer related transactions. A
consumer credit sale is defined as:
a.
The granting .of credit by "a seller who
regularly engages as a seller in credit transactions of the
same kind,"
b.

A

buyer who is a person other than an organization,

c.

The goods and services are purchased primarily
for personal, family, household or agricultural purchases,
and,
d.

The debt is payable in installments.

The Defendant's counterclaim alleged that the Plaintiff
attempted to charge interest in excess of that allowed by
law. The entire case hinges upon the fact that 18.16% was
written on the face of the snowmobile contract. The Defendant
simply assumes that the u.c.c.c. provision incorporates the
Plaintiff. The statute emphasises that the seller must
regularly engage as a seller in credit transactions of the
same kind. Plaintiff was regularly engaged in a gas and
grocery business in Rich County and did allow some revolving
credit accounts, such as Defendants, but he did not attempt
to collect an interest rate higher than 12% on such accounts.
"Distinctions must be drawn between persons engaging in
the business of making loans and those who make infrequent
loans, for occasional acts of loaning money to accommodate
ones customers and friends does not constitute engaging
in the business of loaning money." Hammond v. Reeves
552 P2d 1237, 89N.M. 389.

In Hammond the lender was shown to have made 5 small
loans. The majority of his business came from a different
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source of income. ,The Court of App~als affirmed the trial
court decision that the lender was ~ot engaged in- the business
.'~;:~•:~:~~Yi;
of lending.
As Hammond explains, whether one engages in the business
of lending money or credit transactions is to be determined
fro~ all the circumstances.
A careful examination of the
facts shows that the selling of the snowmobile on the Plaintiff's
part was a unique situation and that the Plaintiff did not
regularly engage in credit transactions of the same kind.
Since ?O(B)-2-104 applies to those who regularly en~age as
"s~llers in credit transact~on, of the same kind," it is not
applicable to our present situation. since Defendant's
entire counterclaim rests upon the fact t~at the contract
for the snowmobile had 18 .16% interest per ar~nurn printed on
its face it fails because the u.c.c.c. is not applicable in
th.i~ situation.

In summary, the trial court made no finding of excessive
interest rates in this case. The calculations of the amount
charged resulted in an actual rate less than the allowable
rate provided by the u.c.c.c. No charge was ever received
in this case. No compensable harm was incurred by the
Defendant, who kept the item without even paying principal
until this suit was filed. The u.c.c.c. does not apply to
the snowmobile contract. Since the Defendant rested his
ent.ire counterclaim on the snowmobile contract, the Trial
Court correctly dismissed it.
POIN'I' 4

The Trial Cou.t properly refused tn award Defendant's
attorney's fees because Defendant failed to show a violation
of the r1.c.c.c. There is no reason to pay Defendants attorney
fees in this matter.
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CONCLUSION
The Plaintiff may not have been successful in all he
asked for, but he clearly showed that there was more due
than had been paid on the open account. He also showed that
there was a principal balance due on the snowmobile contract.
He disclosed that the interest being charged on the open
account was 12% and the full legal rate of 18~ on the snowmobile
contract. He may not have been successful in all his claims,
but he was certainly successful in showing that he was
entitled to be paid. The Court ruled on all of the issues
and made findings which would foreclose any relief for the
Defendant under its Counterclaim. The Court properly dismissed
the Defendant's Counterclaim because no violation of the
u.c.c.c. occured.
RESPECTIVELY submitted this

~~day

of July, 1980.

Raymond N. Malouf, For

'
MALO , MALOUF & JENKINS''
Attorneys for Plaintiff, R
21 West Center
Logan, UT 84321
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